Saving Ukrainian Families One at a Time
Another Commentary Coming from
An American in Ukraine
by Dr. E. C. Olson, Mission Director
A Life and Death Game of Monopoly
In the Ukraine War it’s all about geography – who will end up with Crimea, and Donetsk-Luhansk?
As both armies dig in for what promises to be a brutal winter, not much will be decided until spring arrives – unless something “major” happens. And unexpectedly, that “something major” may have just arrived in the form of an unprecedented $3 billion U.S. military aid package.
But another looming threat – a nuclear accident – may create major problems, especially for a peaceful end to this war.
BREAKING NEWS: On August 23rd, the United States made a surprising announcement about sending Ukraine what amounts to the single largest tranche of military aid since the war began – $3 billion in funding from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative – to be used to secure Ukraine’s longer-term strength and defensive posture. These funds will cover contracts between Ukraine and private industry for drones, weapons, and other equipment, along with funds for training Ukrainian troops over the next two years.
But even more important, the U.S. timed the release of this aid funding for August 24th, Ukraine’s Independence Day, meant to send the Russians and the world the clear message that the U.S. is backing Ukraine for as long as the war requires.
As our Mission website followers will recognize, this newest aid package is coming on the heels of a $800 million aid package that was announced on August 20th (as described in our “Timely Mission Bulletin” from that same day).
Clearly the timing of this latest aid package and the large dollar amount were decided as such to attain a maximum positive effect on the battlefield, and in the mind of Russia President Putin, and for reinforcing U.S.’s leadership-by-example among our Western allies.
Since this new aid package provides Ukraine with a new and very meaningful ability to change the outcome of the war (which is otherwise the primary focus of this article) I’m amending this article to first cover the news about the August 23rd U.S. aid package).
It didn’t take long for Ukraine observers to point out how well thought-out this aid package was, especially it’s size and it’s timing. It was both strategic and tactical, and its audience included not just the Ukrainians (both military and civilian) and Americans, but also all of Europe and Russia, with the latter also obviously concluding that this messaging was intended specifically for President Vladimir Putin. That point is often overlooked by everyday Americans, all they see is yet another government giveaway, and especially given how frequent these announcements have been, some uninformed Americans conclude that not much thought could be put into this high-volume spending.
However, in this instance with this latest aid package, actually the opposite is true, which illustrates just how politically savvy the U.S. government is with respect to Ukraine. First and foremost, this aid package was intended to bolster not just the Ukrainian military’s capacity to fight a modern war, but also to elevate the spirits and morale of everyday Ukrainian soldiers; outside of actually sending American soldiers to Ukraine to fight alongside the Ukrainians, this massive military aid package could not possibly send a louder, more affirmative, more resounding message of support for the Ukrainian military and civilians (especially when one considers that a brutal winter is slowly descending upon Ukraine).
Why we are focusing our reporting on US military and humanitarian aid packages…beginning with the obvious: approximately 50% of the US aid destined for Ukraine is in the form of humanitarian and medical aid equipment and supplies, a small portion of which would be available to our Mission. But in speaking specifically about the military aid, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pointed out additional importance, “These military capabilities are carefully calibrated to make the most difference on the battlefield and strengthen Ukraine’s position at the negotiating table”.
There’s no question that as long as the war continues, the need for humanitarian aid will only increase significantly, so anything that brings about a peaceful end to this war is important to us and our Mission.
However, this new aid package (along with the most recent, August 20th aid package) also carries greater significance to our interests because it demonstrably states that the U.S. is re-doubling its support for Ukraine by providing two very large aid packages in succession, with the funding and equipment now being for meeting not just Ukraine’s short-term need for ammunition and other expendable supplies, but also its mid-term and long-term needs in terms of equipment and training.
And it is timed to further arm Ukraine during this period when the war’s momentum has shifted decidedly in favor of the Ukrainians, and finally, it will provide the Ukrainian military with a psychological and military shot-in-the-arm, rewarding them for persistently beating a much larger, better armed foe on the battlefield.
Second, this aid package has a targeted message for the Ukrainian government, one that is further reaffirming that again, outside of sending U.S. troops to fight in Ukraine, the U.S. is totally committed to providing the maximum amount of military equipment and supplies to the Ukrainians – the best, most modern weapons, especially the long-range armament that has proven to be so consequential in Ukraine’s recent victories on the battlefield. So, in a way this also can be seen as a reward given to the Ukraine military, for their courage and valor, their ability to quickly and expertly operate this modern sophisticated weaponry, and their ability to efficiently translate the results on the battlefield.
Third, this aid package has several messages for the American public imbedded in it and its announcement, all being driven by the realization by America’s government and military leaders that “Ukraine crisis fatigue” has begun to set in, and that they need to pull out all the stops in countering that negative messaging, which President Biden did quite effectively, telling Americans that the U.S. will stick by Ukraine regardless of how long the war lasts. Obviously, the U.S. government needs to convince all American voters and elected officials of this needed resolve, but with a major mid-term election looming, whether that will succeed or not is still in question.
And there in that political realm, speaking now for myself and not our Mission, it is quite perplexing that the Republican Party, the political party that has much more so than the Democratic Party persistently opposed Russia and before that the Soviet Union, and Republicans have always been the most anti-communist political force in America – and yet in recent weeks I have heard the early rumblings by Republicans like Rand Paul questioning America’s support of Ukraine, and it appears as if that position has gained traction among some parts of the Republican Party, but there again, weren’t fervent right-wingers from the Republican Party always those who have quite often belligerently opposed Russia and its President – and these are the same people that are now questioning our support of a nation fighting Russia? I’m confused and frustrated.
Another aspect of this latest U.S. aid package also offers something for those conservative hawks in Congress and those from the military industrial complex: the funding for this latest $3 billion aid package was already approved months ago by a Congressional vote in support of Ukraine, to give the Ukrainians funding so that they can contract with private sector companies to purchase these weapons (that’s a bone to those who are fervent private sector, free market capitalism supporters).
Also, President Biden pointed out that this aid does not come as part of the drawdown of the U.S.’s own military equipment inventory, therefore alleviating any concerns that supplying Ukraine will not jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to arm its own soldiers.
Fourth, another part of the intended messaging was clearly focused on Europe, where the U.S. again exhibits leadership by example. Here Washington wants to show Europe that the U.S. is willing to commit sizable dollars for a war that is an ocean-and half-of-Eurasia away. This may have had an effect already with the U.K., for on Ukraine’s Independence Day, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a $63.5 million military aid package, and shortly thereafter Sweden and Finland both offered new aid packages as well.
And last but certainly not least of the imbedded messaging in the latest U.S. $3 billion aid package was a very clear message being sent to Russia and President Vladimir Putin by the U.S.: “if you are fighting Ukraine, then you are also fighting the United States”, and “we will stand by our Ukrainian allies as long as it takes for them to win the war”.
That message was further reinforced because in this aid package, the U.S. again did not hide the fact that it was including in this package numerous long-range armament systems, along with greater air defense equipment – both of which allow Ukraine to effectively defeat whatever military effort the Russians are throwing at them.
That brings our discussion back to the arena where all of this matters even more – on the battlefield.
As the war reaches the sixth month mark since the Russian invasion, an overall stalemate has emerged, with Russia scoring more minor victories in the northeastern end of the fighting, while Ukraine has decidedly claimed victory in the southwestern end. And with winter approaching, both sides are digging in to do battle against each other and the elements. But first, to put this new information into its greater context…
Depending on which “expert” one listens to (in our reporting we have purposefully excluded both Ukraine and Russia’s government information in our reporting due to their serious biases) the Ukraine war is entering the second or third stage of the fighting and while experts argue over which stage it really is, nearly all of them agree that Ukraine has prevailed…
…at least in the southern or southwestern portion of the country, where their July-August counteroffensive scored significant victories in pushing the Russians back across the front lines and back towards Russia, while at the same time succeeding in making numerous missile, rocket and conventional artillery attacks deep in Russian-controlled areas and destroying valuable military equipment (including six Russian jets at their Crimean tactical air base), along with munitions, fuel and other vital logistical supply-chain elements.
At the other end of the front lines, stretching from the badly battered city of Kharkiv (Ukraine’s second largest city with a pre-war population of 1.4 million) down to Luhansk and Donetsk, the epicenter of the overall war fighting is found in this stretch of the front lines, there Russia has accomplished more of its agenda, which is to literally destroy Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and to terrorize the Ukrainians with brutal psychological warfare.
Below you will find a map depicting the latest status of the fighting, “The Ukraine War Status”.
Until the August 23rd major announcement of one of the war’s largest ever aid packages from the U.S. to Ukraine, the consensus was that in the next six months both sides will be fighting the elements as much as they are their military opponents, and this may well limit either side from gaining any meaningful ground until winter is over.
However, there are some who believe (this author included) that this newest $3 billion aid package, when combined with the last announcement of nearly one billion dollars in military aid will change that scenario somewhat significantly. The belief is that these new supplies of ammunition and weapons (especially more of the long-range weaponry, such as the highly coveted HIMARS weapon system, and especially any aerial defense systems) will allow Ukraine to make one more major offensive push before winter sets in. More than likely, that offensive move would take place in the southern portion of the fighting, along the front lines stretching from Mykolaiv and Kherson south to Crimea.
The Ukraine War Status – Looking forward from late-August until Spring
On the map below are shown the four regions of the War – each representing a different present-tense and future destiny, beginning with the “relatively safe” northern one-third of Ukraine (A), where life in major cities like Lviv and Kyiv will remain much as they are, only rarely experiencing Russian long-range missile attacks; the western half of this region will be the least changed by the war: closely aligned with Europe and solidly Ukrainian. At the far eastern end of this region the story is somewhat different with Russia or their ally Belarus forming the entire border with Ukraine. At any time, Russian forces could launch artillery or missile attacks across the border, or like they did in February, launch another ground invasion. Conditions in the central portion of Ukraine (B) is a blend of those on both sides – relatively safe and peaceful, but prone to vicious isolated Russian missile attacks like the one that devastated Vinnytsya. The next region southeast (C) will continue to experience significant fighting in the months ahead, but their long-term fate remains tied to greater Ukraine. The borders and contents of region D mirror the red-shaded footprint of the current active fighting. Its long-term fate is up in the air, with Ukraine mostly prevailing in the southwest and Russia in the northeast.
The lynchpin: Crimea – it took until the sixth month of the war (August) for attention to be focused on Crimea, which came in the form of a concerted combined military-political Ukrainian effort, with President Zelensky boldly asserting that the war will not end until Crimea is in Ukrainian hands. He backed that pronouncement with weeks of isolated shelling of Russian military sites, causing significant damage to Russian military assets and a public relations nightmare for President Vladimir Putin.
Two renegade Russian-backed “republics” – the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic declared independence from Ukraine in 2014 and have remained steadfastly supportive of Russia.
This region remains the main axis of the fighting and that will likely continue in the months ahead. Experts agree it would take a very significant change in the war’s momentum in favor of Ukraine for this region to be re-occupied and ultimately retained by Ukraine at war’s end, but President Zelensky remains committed to doing that, and the new Western aid may help with that.
What’s unknown is if President Zelensky would be satisfied at the war’s end if Ukraine could keep Crimea but give up parts of or all of Luhansk and/or Donetsk. This then becomes a deadly game of Monopoly.
Collateral Damage – the cities of Mykolaiv and Kherson, the former occupied by Ukraine and the latter Russia, typify the status and fate of a large number of small-to-mid-sized cities in southern Ukraine that will continue to remain severely battered but resilient in the months ahead; Kharkiv could share the same fate.
The Wild Card: the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant – Even before the war started, Ukraine and the West worried about Russia eventually using nuclear weapons – a real threat that still remains – however, over the past several weeks that morphed into a concern that conventional military attacks would cause a nuclear disaster to occur at Europe’s largest nuclear power facility. Depending on all of the inherent variables associated with any kind of nuclear accident, there’s no way to determine just how disruptive this could be in determining where the war goes from there. As such, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant is the war’s primary wild card, while the other wild card is the size, nature, type, speed and frequency of the U.S.’s military aid packages.
As just noted, the only other factor that could also change the course of the war is how much additional military aid will be coming in the next 3-6 months from the U.S. and the West. If the next 2-3 aid packages are of the type and size of this August 25th one, and especially if these aid packages include any number of advanced long-range weaponry or possibly tactical aircraft or possibly a more sophisticated aerial defense system, akin to Israel’s Iron Dome – all of which would substantially increase the Ukrainian’s chances of continuing to win more strategic battles than the Russians – then the winter would not be just a continuation of the overall stalemate.
For that we will just have to wait and see.
Obviously, our concern about the war’s status is best understood if we look at the war status as also being a humanitarian aid need status, where the greater the Russian attacks, the more land and civilian infrastructure they will destroy (and the more Ukrainians they will kill and injure), then the greater humanitarian aid need there will be.
At the other extreme end of the spectrum, if the Ukrainians (obviously armed with a great deal of military aid of the right type they get from the West) continue to score victory after victory, and especially if they are able to isolate Crimea from Russia. And if in the north the Ukrainians are able to effectively destroy Russia’s supply depots and rear guard, thus isolating Russian troops on the front lines – then conceivably the negotiating table would be set in Ukraine’s favor. If that happens while anti-war unrest inside Russia continues to rise (or if the Russian oligarchs tell Putin “enough is enough”), then Russia coming to the negotiating table is not unreasonable.
But when or if that happens, it is fairly certain that Ukrainian President Zelensky will remain steadfast in his requirement that Russia must return ALL Ukrainian land to Ukraine – including Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk – then that might be too steep a price for Putin to accept.
Time will tell, but the one factor that will absolutely remain the same and independent of all these other political and military factors is the weather – which WILL be brutal for both sides. There the question will again be front-and-center presented to President Putin – are you going to make the same mistake again of launching a major offensive move in Ukraine during winter (as they did in invading Ukraine last February) – which in itself was a mistake of not learning the lessons of WWII.
In WWII, both the Soviet army and the German army made the mistake of trying to execute major winter offensive (and defensive) moves during winter(s), and both sides paid an incredibly grim cost for that. The loss of life was no less than staggering as on the Soviet side, 7 million soldiers died in combat while another 3.6 million died in German POW camps. The Germans lost 4 million in action, while another 3 million died in Soviet gulags.
In another analogy to the current war in Ukraine, civilians suffered horribly during WWII because of the nature of both Germany’s and Soviet’s occupation policies, again with the vast majority of deaths occurring in winter. Around 15 million Soviet civilians were killed, while 3 million Poles were killed along with another 3 million Jewish Poles, while German civilian deaths topped 2 million.
As the National Interest Organization best put it, “Statistics of this magnitude are inevitably imprecise, and scholars on all sides of the war continue to debate the size of military and civilian losses. There is little question, however, that the War in the East was the most brutal conflict ever endured by humankind”.
While the current war in Ukraine is being fought on a much smaller scale than WWII, the point is still the same: wars fought with these classic WWII-type massive ground and artillery assaults, especially when conducted during winter and with an enormous civilian population at risk, result in an enormous death toll. Military experts were dumbfounded when Putin replayed this same war strategy when the invasion began, and even more confounded by the fact that Putin has persisted in using these brutal military gambits throughout this war – and it appears as if he is still sticking with this strategy as the Ukraine winter sets in.
Therefore, in watching this deadly game of Monopoly playing out, we will be paying very close attention to the evolution of the following factors:
First and foremost, we will focus on Crimea, along with Kherson and Mykolaiv, and we will continually track this see-saw fighting, where presently Ukrainian forces are using long-range artillery and rockets to strike what previously were untouchable military targets, while Russia appears to be unprepared to defend against this. In another of Russia’s perplexing war strategies (or lack thereof), despite Crimea being physically connected to Russia (by bridge), the Russians apparently have not adequately staffed this region, reducing their defensive capabilities, and that in-part is what resulted in Ukraine destroying a significant number of military sites on the peninsula in the past 2-3 weeks. Throughout this, we should keep in mind the fact that Ukrainian President Zelensky has insisted that there will be no end to the war until and unless the Russians return Crimea, and that apparently remains as a bridge-too-far for Russian President Putin.
Associated with Crimea both geographically and strategically are Kherson (Russian-controlled but under persistent fierce attack by a Ukrainian counter-offensive) and Mykolaiv (Ukraine-controlled but subject to sporadic missile and rocket attacks). It appears to be Ukraine’s strategy here is to continue to press southward from Mykolaiv, aided by long-range artillery and rocket attacks, continually forcing the Russians to retreat to a point where the Ukrainians will regain control of Kherson. From there it appears that Ukraine will establish a new base of operations from which they will pursue control of Crimea.
Second, we will continue to monitor the action occurring in the “main axis” of the front-line combat, primarily in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. There Russia seems to be much better prepared on both the offensive and defensive side of the fighting, which is perhaps why they have won more battles than they have lost in this region. We need to keep in mind that in these oblasts, Russia is uniquely benefitting from the fact that a sizable portion of the residents there are either supportive or sympathetic to the Russian’s efforts. But by the time winter sets in it is doubtful that the Russians will gain much more new ground primarily because they have persistently under-performed militarily speaking, and that is most likely to continue. One thing to watch however, is that without much fan-fare, President Putin out out a call to enlist another 110,000 soldiers, which could well be desited for assignment either in this northern axis of the fighting (to secure their hold on Luhansk and Donetsk) or down south where they could defend Kherson, and ultimately, Crimea.
Third, we will of course stay closely tuned to the fighting in and around the region where the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is located. Slight progress has been made in allowing UN inspectors to conduct safety status checks, but little else has been done to lessen the threat, which would be existential for a major portion of Ukraine.
But just as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant was seldom if ever mentioned in coverage of the war since the late-February Russian invasion, we need to recognize that there are three other nuclear power plants in Ukraine, and while none are presently situated in areas experiencing daily warfare, other than that there is nothing preventing them from being held hostage by threats of Russian attack.
I will end this article appropriately by asking the question: “What would a Ukraine victory over Russia look like?” The answer to that question I found in one of the best overall articles I have found on this topic – at the 19fortyfive.com website in an August 27th article written by Steve Balestrieri.
“The Russian invasion of Ukraine is now grinding on into its seventh month. While many analysts believed that the country would fall within weeks, the Ukrainians proved that they were much better prepared than in 2014. Russia hoped to blitzkrieg Kyiv and Kharkiv in the war’s earliest days. They were repulsed by horrendous losses of troops and equipment. They took Kherson in the south thanks to some Ukrainian officials that were sympathetic to Russia.
However, the war then turned into a protracted stalemate. Russian troop advances would be measured in yards per day as they would blast small areas with concentrated artillery and missile strikes. Back about a month ago, I wrote in these digital pages that with the massive artillery strikes the Russians are conducting, it was fair to question how long their artillery barrels would last. Keep in mind that their manufacturing is decidedly inferior to Western arms makers.
There are still splits on whether Russia or Ukraine can actually “win” the war. So, what would a Ukrainian victory look like?
With Western Europe being large consumers of Russian gas, there are shortages everywhere which are causing inflation to rise. This is why some Europeans and many Africans urging Ukraine to agree to cede the territory lost to buy peace by appeasing Putin. That is precisely what Putin is waiting for. A cold winter with fuel shortages and rising prices will cause Western Europeans to tire of the war and force Kyiv to accept a favorable settlement to Moscow.
Europe should know that appeasement doesn’t work with authoritarian rulers with dreams of imperial conquest. England and France negotiated a concession of part of Czechoslovakia without their consent in 1938 against Hitler. When returning from Munich, UK Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain promised his people “peace in our time” while waving the paper with the agreement. Less than a year later, Britain and France were at war with Germany.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said earlier this week that Kyiv would not agree to any proposal to freeze the current frontlines to appease Moscow. Because even if Putin and Zelensky agree to a stop of conflict where the lines now lay, there is no reason to believe he won’t continue his imperialistic actions in the future. He needs to be stopped and pushed back.
Putin is not suicidal, nor is he the irrational leader that was the previous line of thought. He’s pragmatic, and all of his actions are carefully thought out. With the added weaponry that Ukraine’s armed forces needs, it is entirely possible that they can throw the Russians back to at least the starting point of the war.
Crimea, however, a goal that President Zelensky has reiterated several times as a goal in retaking, is, for now, probably going to have to wait. “The war began in Crimea — and it will also end there,” he said. Kherson is, however, a different story.
With the Ukrainians rendering the bridges connecting Kherson to Russia’s supply lines in Crimea unusable, Moscow has been reduced to re-supplying its forces via pontoon bridges. Those are highly vulnerable to artillery or missile strikes. Russian forces could become stranded in the city, making them vulnerable to a counter-attack. Two weeks ago, there were reports that Russian commanders of troops in Kherson withdrew their headquarters to the eastern shore of the Dnieper River.
The Ukrainians can win the war, but they will need far more help to do so. War is ultimately about will, logistics, and strategy. “The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…” – Sun Tzu. They have the will. But they have enough logistics? Time will tell.
Reporting by Steve Balestrieri for 19fortyfive.com